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Abstract 
Using tariffs as a measure of openness, this paper finds consistent evidence that the 
conditional effects of trade liberalization on inequality are correlated with relative factor 
endowments. Trade liberalization, measured by changes in tariff revenues, is associated with 
increases in inequality in countries well-endowed in highly skilled workers and capital or with 
workers that have very low education levels. Similar, though less robust, results are also 
obtained when decile data are used instead of the usual Gini coefficients. Taken together, 
the results are strongly supportive of the factor-proportions theory of trade and suggest that 
trade liberalization in poor countries where the share of the labor force with little education is 
high raises inequality. Simulation results also suggest that relatively small changes in 
inequality as measured by aggregate measures of inequality like the Gini coefficient are 
magnified when estimates are carried out using decile data.    
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1. Introduction   
 
The relation between openness, inequality and poverty within 
countries continues to be subject to considerable controversy 
in the debate about globalization and in the academic 
literature where the relative importance of the different 
transmission channels linking openness to inequality and 
poverty remains elusive. First, detailed case studies 
decomposing the sources of the evolution of income inequality 
within countries reveal very different patterns across 
countries. As to trade liberalization and openness--usually 
understood to mean the ease with which goods and services, 
factors of production (e.g. capital, labor and skills) move 
across countries as transaction costs fall-—they are often 
used interchangeably and captured by a trade-to-GDP ratio 
which captures many other features of a country’s exposure to 
trade. Second, whether from specific trade liberalization 
episodes or from cross-country studies, the evidence on the 
relation between trade liberalization and inequality is 
conflicting.1 Third, in most cross-country studies, 
identification comes from cross-country variability in the 
inequality measure and no attempt is made to control for the 
source of the data on inequality.  
If one were asked to point towards an emerging consensus, 
it would probably be that increasing openness has been 
reflected in a growing wage gap between skilled and unskilled 
wages. Moving to the association between openness and overall 
                     
1
 Bourguignon, Ferreira and Lustig eds. (2005, table 10.1) show the variety 
of underlying changes in inequality across four countries. Using four 
household surveys spanning the period of Mexican tariff liberalization, 
Nicita (2004) explores systematically the channels by which the Mexican 
trade liberalization affected households. He finds differential pass-
through effects across commodities and strong effects on spatial inequality 
and concludes that, overall, tariff liberalization might have been 
associated with a reduction in poverty, but that inequality increased. Case 
study evidence is not considered further in this paper. Also see Galiani 
and Porto (2006) for a country study on trade liberalization and wage 
inequality in Argentina. 
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inequality (usually measured by the Gini coefficient) the 
evidence remains very mixed: many studies find no evidence of 
openness on inequality, or that openness increases inequality 
at all levels of development.2 
 More intriguing to many is the lack of robustness towards 
expectations from the standard factor-endowment-based trade 
model (Heckscher-Ohlin – HO for short): conflicting evidence 
that greater openness reduces (increases) inequality in 
developing (developed) countries and very qualified support 
for the hypothesis that endowments matter along the expected 
lines (see below), not to mention little support for robust 
results between trade liberalization and inequality.3 The lack 
of correlation between factor endowments and inequality should 
also come as a surprise to scholars working on the 
institutional foundations of development who generally find 
strong evidence that endowments matter in the evolution of a 
country’s inequality (Hoff (2004)).  
 Perhaps this should not come as a surprise and not 
concern us too much if, via other channels such as growth, 
increased openness reduces poverty. After all, HO theory 
should only be expected to inform us about the relation 
between endowments and factor rewards in response to a reform-
induced change in relative factor demands rather than between 
endowments and overall income inequality which is determined 
by many other factors. And, as pointed out by Baldwin (2004, 
p. 517) in his review of the trade liberalization and growth 
literature, since trade liberalization is rarely applied in 
isolation, it makes little sense to try and isolate its 
effects from those of associated policies.  
                     
2
 Barro (2000), Lundberg and Squire (2003) and Milanovic (2005) find that 
openness increases inequality whereas Edwards (1997), Ravallion (2001) or 
Dollar and Kraay (2002) find no significant relationship.   
3
 See Anderson (2005) for a survey of the conflicting evidence on openness 
and inequality, and Winters et al. (2004) for a survey of the evidence on 
trade liberalization and poverty. Spilimbergo et al. (1999), Milanovic 
(2005) and Bensidoun et al. (2005) are the studies most closely related to 
ours.   
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In contrast to this agnosticism, following an exhaustive 
review of the evidence on trade liberalization and poverty, 
Winters et al. (2004, p. 108) conclude that trade 
liberalization might be the easiest poverty-alleviating reform 
to accomplish, and the most powerful direct mechanism to 
alleviate poverty in a country. If so, knowing more about the 
links between trade policy and inequality is important since, 
from a political-economy perspective, knowledge about the 
links between openness and inequality will inform about the 
feasibility of policies that increase openness and are likely 
to reduce poverty. 
 We bring new evidence on this issue using two data sets 
covering a larger sample of developing countries than most 
previous studies. We introduce fixed-effects (FE) so that 
identification of the effects of globalization is confined to 
variations in that country’s variables. We also broaden the 
range of control variables to address omitted variable bias. 
In this set up, we find rather consistently that trade 
liberalization is associated with increases in inequality. 
Second, unlike most previous studies, we find that endowments 
matter along the lines suggested by the standard HO theory 
arguments reviewed in section 2. We find consistently that 
trade liberalization is associated with increases in 
inequality in countries that are relatively well-endowed with 
capital and with highly skilled workers while it associated 
with decreases in inequality in countries relatively well-
endowed in primary educated (unskilled) workers and in arable 
land. On the other hand, as suggested by Wood (1994, 2002), we 
find that trade liberalization is associated with increases in 
inequality in countries relatively well-endowed with workers 
lacking basic education. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses 
the main channels linking openness and trade liberalization to 
inequality identified in the literature along with the two 
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data sets used in this paper. Using data over the period 1980-
2000, section 3 establishes that the correlation between trade 
liberalization and inequality follows patterns predicted by 
factor-proportions theories. These results are largely 
confirmed with a ‘high quality’ data set (based on deciles) 
covering the period 1988-98 in section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Transmission Channels and Data 
 
2.1 Transmission Channels 
The debate on the channels through which openness might affect 
inequality has largely revolved around the role of openness-
induced changes in relative factor demands and their 
consequent expected effects on factor rewards. For natural-
resource-rich countries, though they do not deal directly with 
trade liberalization, Leamer et al. (1999), provide plausible 
scenarios and some evidence as to why the development paths of 
such countries could lead to rising inequality.  
 Concentrating on accumulable endowments where rent 
effects should be minimal, Wood (2002) provides a convenient 
summary of the different channels via which globalization 
might affect wage inequality (see also Kremer and Maskin 
(2003)). As all forms of transaction costs fall with 
globalization, factor mobility (capital via FDI and Northern 
K-workers in the terminology of Wood) is enhanced, leading to 
greater cooperation of Northern K-workers who travel to work 
with skilled workers in the South. In the South, workers with 
little or no-education (and hence low wages) would then be 
expected to be confined to non-traded activities. Trade 
liberalization would then not only lead to rising wages for 
skilled workers in the North and in the South, but under 
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plausible assumptions, it would also lead to an increase in 
wage inequality in the South.4  
Feenstra and Hanson (1996) interpret globalization as an 
increase in FDI (rather than a movement of K-workers) leading 
to a rising volume of trade in intermediates (see Hummels et 
al. (2001) for supporting evidence) as the process of 
production leads to a fragmentation of production. Again, in a 
HO framework where a continuum of intermediates are produced 
by the North and the South, and where the North is relatively 
well-endowed in skilled labor and capital (with capital and 
skilled labor complementary factors in production), Feenstra 
and Hanson, echoing Wood, show that an increase in FDI can 
lead to rising wages for skilled workers in the North and the 
South as FDI raises the skill-intensiveness of production in 
both countries.5  
In reality, other channels beyond changes in factor 
rewards will affect inequality when a country becomes more 
outward-oriented. At the simplest level, in the Ricardo-Viner 
model changes in relative prices lead to changes in the 
purchasing-power of households, and if the poor consume the 
exported good intensively, trade liberalization could increase 
income inequality. Several exercises using simulation models 
reported in Hertel and Winters eds. (2006) quantify the 
potential magnitude of some of these channels, notably the 
                     
4
 In a two-sector model (tradables and non-tradables) with capital and two 
categories of workers (skilled and unskilled), in which the three household 
categories are not diversified in their factor-ownership holdings and the 
unskilled are confined to the non-tradable sector, Bensidoun et al. (2005) 
show formally that an increase in the wage of skilled labor (brought about 
by increased openness) will increase the value of the Gini index if the 
share of unskilled labor is large enough.  
5
 Arguing that much trade is between rich countries and that much trade can 
be viewed as the production of a single product manufactured by outsourcing 
of components made and assembled in different countries, Kremer and Maskin 
(2003) develop a model in which globalization (again an increase in FDI) 
can plausibly lead to an increasing wage gap between skilled and unskilled 
workers in both the North and the South. The key mechanism in their model 
is that globalization leads to more cross-matching than self-matching 
(workers with the same skill levels working together).  
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poverty implications of tariff reductions on the purchasing 
power of households with different expenditure patterns. 
More importantly, there are other context-specific 
transmission channels (see Winters et al. (2004) for 
discussion) which cannot be captured in a cross-country 
exercise seeking to extract common elements that are likely to 
hold across a range of countries. For example, as shown by 
Nicita (2004) in his detailed case study of tariff 
liberalization in Mexico during the 90s, price pass-through 
effects were substantially different across commodities, and 
the poverty effects of trade liberalization varied 
substantially across regions.  
 
2.2 Framework and Data  
 
Using panel data, the literature has usually estimated a 
relation of the form: 
 0 1 1it itit l it it
l
INQ Y OPEN Zα α β δ ε+= +  + +∑  (1) 
where itINQ  is the measure of inequality, itY  is average income 
per capita (either from the national accounts or from 
household surveys), itOPEN  is a measure (eventually lagged to 
control for endogeneity) that proxies for the country’s 
outward-orientation6, and itZ  is a vector of control variables. 
In the discussion above, there is no role for income as an 
explanatory variable. Its inclusion rests on some variant of a 
Kuznets-type relationship and for relative endowments, but 
also for structural changes (other than endowments but 
including increased financial integration) that are associated 
with rising GDP per capita and could affect the transmission 
of globalization-related effects to households.  
                     
6
 Greater outward-orientation goes beyond integration in goods markets. It 
includes integration in capital markets, as well as behind-the-border 
measures. Insofar as a reduction in transaction costs affect countries 
equally, these can be ignored. See further discussion below. 
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 Note the absence of country fixed effects in (1). For 
example, in their widely-cited study examined below, 
Spilimbergo et al.(1999) do not control for country-specific 
features that could account for differences in inequality such 
as labor market specificities emphasized by Rama (2002)), 
productivity differences (see Easterly (2004)), or 
institutions (Barro 2000). Nor do more recent studies (e.g. 
Milanovic (2005)) typically use such controls for 
heterogeneity.7 Insofar as omitted factors do not change over 
time, the inclusion of fixed effects controls for such 
idiosyncratic factors. Since our data set covers a rather long 
period, and inevitably some of the relevant omitted variables 
will change over time, this needs to be kept in mind when 
interpreting results. Likewise, the validity of the results 
rests on the assumption that the data reflect a sufficiently 
stable relationship (this is why we exclude all transition 
economies from our samples) and that the same dynamics can be 
imposed on all countries, an assumption that is less likely to 
hold, but about which little can be done. 
 We use two data sets. The first set of results is based 
on five-year average data spanning the 1975-2000 period 
relying on the extensively used Deininger and Squire (D-S) 
data set (augmented to include the year 2000 by the 
availability of the WIDER (2004) data). The second is the more 
recent high-quality data set World Income Distribution (WYD) 
also at approximately five-year intervals which covers the 
1988-1998 period. Using two data sets provides further 
robustness checks, and the second data set is helpful when 
trying to quantify effects of trade liberalization on poverty. 
Table 1 shows that our sample has a good representation across 
                     
7
 Among the studies that control for heterogeneity, Edwards (1997, 43 
countries, 70s and 80s) finds no evidence that openness or trade 
liberalization increases inequality. When including fixed effects, Barro 
(2000, 84 countries for 1960-90, table 6) finds no correlation between 
inequality and openness, echoing Ravallion’s correlations between average 
household incomes and inequality across 117 growth spells (Ravallion 
(2001), table 1).  
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regions, and that the developing countries are adequately 
represented.8 
Table 1 here: Countries in the Sample 
 
Regarding the variable used to capture a country’s 
outward-orientation, we use lagged tariffs i.e.
, 5i tTAR − , 
(computed as the ratio of tariff revenues to imports) as a 
measure of trade openness. This is a more direct measure of 
openness than those often used previously (i.e. a trade output 
ratio, a ‘trade adjusted ratio’ obtained as a residual from an 
estimated relation of openness, or the Sachs-Warner index). As 
a consequence, our sample does not include the 1960-80 period 
covered in some of the earlier studies. Since most trade 
liberalization in developing countries started in the early 
eighties, this may not be too damaging. 
Figure 1 describes the main characteristics of the data 
at the regional level. The relative patterns of inequality 
remain unchanged across regional groupings, being the highest 
in Latin America and SSA throughout. Within regions, tariff 
dispersion fell and, except for the Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA) region, average tariffs declined during the 
sample period. 
 
Figure 1 here: Box Plots on Gini, Tariffs and GDP per 
capita ($PPP): 1980 and 1995 
 
Table 2 gives regional averages for the two main 
variables of interest, the inequality measure and our measure 
of openness, tariffs computed from customs data (see the annex 
for data sources and data manipulations). There is little 
                     
8
 Only countries with economy-wide inequality measures (‘high-quality’ 
indices according to D-S) are retained in the sample. As a reference for 
comparison among the studies that concentrate on openness and inequality, 
the often-cited study by Spilimbergo et al. (1999) had 17 developed and 17 
developing countries in their sample. 
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variation in the average measure of inequality within regions 
and persistent differences across regions while the measure of 
protection indicates (on average) a downward trend in all 
regions except Africa. Since much of the trade reforms in the 
eighties often consisted of replacing NTBs with tariffs, what 
appears as an increase in protection could in fact represent 
either a reduction, or no increase in protection. In selecting 
tariffs as our measure of openness, we take refuge in the 
often-made observation that the average tariff level is an 
adequate approximation of the restrictiveness of a country’s 
trade regime, and arguably less controversial than other 
measures often used, which in any event, are not available, 
over time (e.g. measures of NTBs).9 Of course, having a measure 
of tariff spreads across industries or between agriculture and 
manufactures would be helpful. Unfortunately such data are not 
available over time for a sufficiently large sample of 
countries. However, as shown by Pritchett and Sethi (1994), 
because of widespread exemptions, tariff revenues do not 
increase proportionately with tariff rates suggesting limited 
further information from having information on tariff spreads.  
 
Table 2 here: Data on Inequality and Openness 
 
 We checked the correlation between our tariff measure for 
openness with other proxies often used. In general, the 
correlation is rather weak, although reassuringly, the 
correlation with the carefully constructed Wacziarg and Welch 
                     
9
 According to Rodrik (2000), (p. 3): “Tariff and non-tariff averages are 
reasonably accurate in ranking countries in terms of trade policy openness, 
and in showing changes in openness over time”. Goldberg and Pavcnik (2004) 
reach the same conclusions and conclude that tariffs capture relatively 
well the combined effects of trade policy changes. They also note that the 
preoccupation about the endogeneity of tariffs is lessened by the fact that 
many countries moved towards a reduction in protection and more uniformity 
in their tariff structures when they became full members of the GATT/WTO. 
Moreover, the use of a synthetic index to measure the restrictiveness of a 
trade regime still has appeal especially during the 70s and 80s when many 
countries still had a multiplicity of trade barriers in their foreign 
exchange regimes. 
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(2003) index is quite high ( )0.56ρ = − .10 In the end, the 
strongest justification for using tariffs is their widespread 
availability and the likelihood that error measurements will 
be less than with other proposed measures.11  
 The main weakness in the data set is the absence of a 
measure of financial openness. Miniane (2004) provides a 
summary of available indices of financial market integration. 
It turns out that even for the WYD data set which only covers 
the 1988-98 period, about 2/3 of the countries in our data set 
would not have a measure of financial market integration. We 
have therefore decided not to tackle the issue of financial 
market integration (using FDI as in e.g. Milanovic (2005), 
would not be appropriate since it is largely an outcome 
variable).  
 
3. Trade Liberalization and Inequality: Endowments matter 
 
We start exploring the basic HO prediction that trade 
liberalization should reduce inequality in low-income 
countries and increase it in high income countries. Next, we 
bring in factor endowments which we interact with the tariff 
variable to isolate the effects of differing endowments on 
inequality. Throughout this section, the data covers the 
period 1980-2000 and the Gini coefficient is the inequality 
measure. 
                     
10
 Unfortunately, for statistical analysis, the Wacziarg and Welch (2003) 
index is a binary variable. Tariffs are also strongly positively correlated 
[correlation coefficient in brackets] with other measures of trade barriers 
such as taxes on input and capital used by Barro & Lee (2002)[0.31]. Among 
the model-based estimates, tariffs are most closely correlated with the 
gravity-based index of Hiscox & Kastner (2002) [0.47] and the residuals 
from adjusted trade ratios estimated econometrically by Leamer (1987) [-
0.43], but weakly with the Pritchett (1996) index [-0.08]. 
11
 Because tariffs do not take into account NTBS, we also correlated several 
frequency indices of NTBs with our tariff measure at the HS-6 level using 
Jon Haveman’s treatment of TRAINS data. Correlations (available upon 
request) for different tariff ranges and the overall NTB frequency index 
ranges between 0.20 and 0.30 confirming high tariffs barriers are 
effectively correlated with high indices of NTBs. 
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3.1 Openness, Income and Inequality 
 
We start with the traditional specification: 
 
 
 
, 5 , 51 1 2
 ,           
1,3
i=1,...,76, t=1,..., 4
( * )
          
it i t i t itit i t
itl it k ikt
l k
INQ D YR Y TAR TAR Y
Z DS e
α β β
δ γ
+ − −
=
= + +  +
+ + +∑ ∑  (2) 
 
In(2), the index of inequality is regressed on a set of 
country dummies iD , a set of year dummies to control for any 
common period shocks , on income per capita measured in PPP, 
itY , tariffs (lagged one-period to control for endogeneity), 
, 5i tTAR − , dummy variables, iktDS , to control for the source of 
inequality data (dummy variables for gross vs. net income, 
income vs. expenditure, and households vs. individuals), and 
on a set of control variables, itZ . All the variables are 
expressed in logarithms.  
As mentioned above, all data are five year averages (this 
helps to control for autocorrelation and measurement error), 
giving us up to four observations across time. The use of 
country fixed-effects reduces considerably the variance in 
inequality to be explained so that measurement errors are 
exacerbated even though taking five year averages should 
attenuate this problem (see Pritchett (2000)). Having more 
data points within countries, as in e.g. Galani and Porto 
(2006) who study the trade-liberalization wage-inequality 
relation in Argentina over thirty years would clearly be a 
superior identification strategy, but such an option is not 
yet in the cards.  
Should an increase in openness (here lower values for 
5itTAR − ) raise inequality, it would be reflected in 1ˆ 0β < , while 
the relationship expected from a ‘basic’ factor-endowment (or 
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HO) interpretation (with capital and labor as the sole 
endowments) would call for 1 2ˆ ˆ0, 0β β> <  since lowering tariffs 
in high-income countries would be expected to increase 
inequality with a turning point at 1
2
Y
β
β= − . 
Estimates in table 3 column 1, with no fixed effects, 
correspond to those usually found in the literature (e.g. 
Barro (2000), Ravallion (2001), Rama (2002)). Under this 
specification, trade liberalization raises inequality in poor 
countries, but reduces it in rich countries (i.e. with income 
per capita higher than 4,414$ PPP in column 1), in 
contradiction with HO expectations. The estimates also 
indicate less inequality in low inflation countries and in 
countries with a higher share of population between 40 and 59 
years old. The sign and coefficient estimates in column 1 are 
robust to the inclusion of year dummies (results not reported) 
which are included in the other estimates. 
 
Insert table 3 here: Inequality, income and openness 
 
Adding dummy variables for the source of income 
inequality data in column 2 improves considerably the fit 
while increasing the significance of the coefficients 
discussed above. In particular, the results contrary to HO 
predictions continue to hold at a higher (now 5%) level of 
significance (the turning point is now 3,600$). The signs on 
the dummies to control for the source of data on income 
inequality have the expected: Gini coefficients based on 
income (households) are higher than those based on expenditure 
(individuals). Our first finding is that all studies should 
control for the source of income inequality data (a point 
already made by Ravallion (2001) and Bensidoun et al. (2005)). 
Since coefficient values on these dummies are always 
significant under our preferred estimation with FE and similar 
 15 
to those reported here in tables 4 and 6, we do not comment on 
this result any further.  
Column 3 introduces fixed-effects (FE) into the 
estimation. Now, the sign of the coefficients for ( )1 2ˆ ˆ,β β  are 
reversed and are coherent with factor endowments even though 
the coefficients are not significant at the 10% confidence 
interval with the standard heteroskedasticity-corrected 
(White) coefficients. Significance is slightly improved when 
we report panel-corrected standard errors in (these are in 
brackets in column 3) and borderline significance is reached 
in column 4 when insignificant variables are excluded.12 Our 
second conclusion is that results from studies that do not 
control for effects of omitted variables via FE are biased and 
that proxies for factor endowments effects behave according to 
expectations.13  
This reversal between OLS and within estimates OLS can be 
understood from the data patterns in figure 1. Since the 
richest countries (OCDE) have the smallest tariffs and the 
lowest level of inequality through time while SSA countries 
have the lowest income par capita, the highest tariffs and the 
highest level of inequality, a level estimation will show that 
countries with low tariffs and high income per capita will 
have the lowest income inequality. However, such a 
relationship does not account for the impact of trade 
liberalization on inequality.  
                     
12
 The Breusch Pagan test and the White test indicate heteroskedasticity in 
the error process (σ2it≠ σ2). We carried out our estimates using two 
estimators: the standard heteroskedasticity-consistent White (1984) 
estimator and the panel-corrected standard errors (PCSEs) estimator 
proposed by Beck and Katz (1995) which is shown to be as good or slightly 
superior to the robust estimator in Monte-Carlo studies for small samples 
(see Beck and Katz (1996, table 2). Since both estimators give very similar 
results, in subsequent tables we only report results based on PCSEs. 
Ethnicity is dropped from the FE estimates because it is time-invariant.  
13
 Since we are mostly interested in endowments (which are all strongly 
correlated with income), we have not attempt to control for the endogeneity 
of income when estimating (3).  
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Changes in inequality could be due to the effects of 
other ongoing reforms such as concurrent stabilization 
policies. For example, Wacziarg and Welch (2003) show that 
trade liberalization often occurs during periods of systemic 
reforms including macro stabilization. Stabilization--here 
proxied by a reduction in inflation--is associated with a 
reduction in inequality (as in e.g. (e.g. Dollar and Kraay 
(2002), Edwards (1997)). However, including this control does 
not alter the relationship, nor does the introduction of other 
control variables that carry the expected signs.14 
 
3.2. Trade Liberalization, Endowments, and Inequality 
 
We now introduce relative endowments directly (rather than 
using income per capita as a proxy) interacting them with the 
openness measure as in previous studies (e.g. Bourguignon and 
Morrisson (1990), Spilimbergo et al. (1999) and Fisher 
(2001)). This allows us to test whether the conditional 
correlation of protection on inequality is sensitive to factor 
endowments. Results are reported in table 4. 
 
 
51 1
1,6
5 *2
1,6 1,3
           ( )
itit i t m imt
m
it itm imt l it k ikt
m l k
INQ D YR TAR RE
TAR RE Z DS e
β φ
φ δ γ
−
=
−
= =
= + +  +
+ + + +
∑
∑ ∑ ∑
 (3) 
 
As suggested by factor-endowment-based theories, relative 
endowment ratios, imtRE , are computed relative to the 
                     
14
 Ethno-linguistic fragmentation and less civil liberties increases 
inequality; financial depth and a high share of mature worker both reduce 
inequality. Spurious correlation from omitted variable bias could still be 
present. For example, trade liberalization could increase investment (see 
evidence in Wacziarg and Welch (2003)) which in turn could be correlated 
with inequality. Barro (2000) finds little correlation between inequality, 
and growth and investment in his sample, but Lundberg and Squire (2003) 
find support for a link in a simultaneous examination of inequality and 
growth. 
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corresponding sample mean per capita endowment.15 The ratios 
are weighted by the trade share in GDP to account for the 
endowments of closed countries that do not compete in the 
world markets with other factors (to help comparisons, we use 
the formula in Spilimbergo et al. (1999), see annex A4).  
 Since when we included fixed effects, most of the control 
variables, itZ  that vary little over time lost significance, so 
we start by including only inflation and the dummies for the 
source of inequality data, both of which keep the same signs 
and significance levels as in columns 4 and 5 of table 3. Here 
with factor endowments entering directly in the specification, 
we are particularly interested in the values of the 
interaction coefficients, 2mφ . A negative (positive) sign for 
these coefficients implies that a given trade liberalization 
increases (reduces) inequality more in countries relatively 
well-endowed in the corresponding endowment.16  
 We include six endowments. Labor is broken down into 
three categories along the lines suggested by the discussion 
in section 2 and indicated in (3): non-educated labor, i.e. 
those who have never been to school or have not completed 
primary school (NO); primary-educated or labor with a basic 
education (BS); and those that have an education level beyond 
high-school (SK). Such a breakdown suggested by the discussion 
                     
15
 We also constructed relative endowments using trading partner countries 
as weights. Results were largely unaffected and are not reported here.   
16
 As a first exercise, not reported here, we replicated the same 
specification as Spilimbergo et al. (1999) confirming their results (i.e. a 
result in conformity with factor-endowment predictions for human capital 
but in contradiction with predictions for physical capital when using their 
openness variable (‘adjusted’ trade ratio instead of tariffs). However, 
when using our preferred measure tariffs, increases in inequality are 
associated with relatively abundant endowments in capital following a 
reduction in tariffs (i.e. the coefficient on the interaction between 
relative endowment in capital per unit of labor, K/L, and the lagged 
tariff, is negative). To our knowledge, this plausible set of results has 
not been found in previous studies. However, with tariffs, the significance 
for the human capital endowment interactive term with tariffs disappears. 
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in section 2, was carried out recently by Bensidoun et al. 
(2005) in a slightly different context.17,18  
 
Insert table 4 here: Inequality, factor endowments and 
openness 
 
 As to remaining endowments, Wood (2003) suggests that 
arable land per worker (AT/L) (as in Spilimbergo et al. 
(1999), Fisher (2001) or Leamer et al. (1999)) is not 
sufficient to encompass natural resources and suggests using 
land per worker (T/L). Whereas arable land per worker captures 
factor intensities in the production of food and raw 
materials, it does not include mining and fuels which are the 
less equally-distributed resources. This may explain why 
several studies find that a strong endowment in arable land is 
associated with increases inequality during trade 
liberalization (Spilimbergo et al. (1999) and Perry and 
Olarreaga (2006)). Thus we use a direct measure of endowments 
in mining and fuels MF/L (captured by production in minerals, 
fuels and coal), next to the measure of arable land.  
The first three columns of Table 4 test the significance 
of endowments relative to labor. Column 1 confirms the 
expectation that trade liberalization in countries with 
relatively high endowments in K/L and NO/L is associated with 
                     
17
 Bensidoun et al. (2005) argue that the Heckscher-Ohlin model is too 
restrictive, relying on factor-price-equalization (FPE) and hence identical 
production techniques in equilibrium. Using a more general approach that 
relaxes the FPE assumption (but still relies on other restrictive 
assumptions like homothetic preferences and unchanged production techniques 
following trade liberalization), they show that factor price changes are 
correlated with the factor content of trade, leading them to test their 
model using constructed estimates of the labor-capital content of net 
exports instead of factor endowments on a similar D-S inequality data set 
for 53 countries. However, their results are not strictly comparable with 
ours (different sample with no SSA countries and a different definition of 
variables). 
18
 The index of human capital endowment (average years of schooling) is now 
replaced by these three different categories of skill levels. We take the 
NO variable from the Barro and Lee (2000) data set which is available on a 
five-year basis that corresponds to the 5-year averages used for all our 
variables. 
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a greater increase in inequality (negative coefficients for 
both interaction terms with lagged tariffs). Column 2 results 
also conform with factor endowment predictions since the 
coefficient on BS/L interacted with lagged tariffs is 
positive, but the K/L interaction term loses significance. The 
same expected pattern also holds in column 3 with SK/L.19 The 
result that trade liberalization is associated with greater 
increases in inequality in countries abundant in highly-
educated labor is consonant with Galiani and Porto’s (2006) 
identification of an increasing skill premium in periods of 
trade liberalization in Argentina. 
 Column 4 controls for the skill composition of the labor 
force by including these three levels of education in ratio 
form to avoid perfect multicollinearity with the country 
dummies: SK/BS, SK/L, and NO/(SK+BS).20 One can verify that, as 
predicted by factor endowment trade theories, during a trade 
liberalization, countries with a relatively (to the sample 
average) strong endowment in SK/BS experience a greater 
increase in inequality, while, after having controlled for 
skill endowments, countries relatively poorly endowed in labor 
with some qualification (i.e. with high values of NO/(SK+BS) 
experience an increase in inequality during a trade 
liberalization. Column 5 shows that the proxy for mineral 
resources is associated with increases in inequality (as is a 
relatively strong endowment in SK/BS and in NO/(SK+BS)). In 
sum, globally the results in table 4 are supportive of factor-
based predictions in almost all cases.  
Table 5 quantifies the effects of a 5 percentage points 
reduction in tariffs on Gini coefficient value for different 
quartiles of the distribution of endowments. As, an example, 
tariff reduction increases the value of the Gini coefficient 
                     
19
 Owing to the high correlation between SK/L and K/L ( )0.84ρ = , the 
coefficient on K/L changes sign and is almost significant statistically.  
20
 Thanks to Adrian Wood for this suggestion. 
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by 0.4% for countries in the bottom quartile of the 
distribution of (K/L), while it increases inequality by 6.0% 
for those in the top quartile. A similar pattern holds for 
(SK)/(BS), with the strongest effect for the ratio 
(NO)/(SK+BS). Since countries with a high share of non-
educated population are also likely to be poorly endowed in 
capital, the two effects almost cancel each other. 
 
Insert table 5 here: Tariff Reduction, inequality and factor 
endowments (see table A7b for full results). 
  
We carried out several robustness checks. First, adding income 
(which serves as a proxy for omitted variables that would 
exert an influence on inequality during trade liberalization) 
is not significant and does not alter the results above. 
Likewise, including several macroeconomic and institutional 
variables largely preserves those results (and the included 
macroeconomic variables often have the predicted signs, 
sometimes at statistically significant levels). For example, 
an improvement in civil liberties or an increase in government 
expenditure is associated with decreases in inequality (see 
results in table A6). Second, similar results are obtained 
when we apply our preferred specification to quintile data 
from the WIDER database (45 countries instead of 61). Results 
are reported in table A7. Third, in the absence of plausible 
instruments for tariffs which might be endogenous21, we test 
for reverse causality by regressing inequality on future 
rather than past tariffs, the results become mostly 
insignificant suggesting that reverse causality is not a 
problem. Fourth, the results are also robust to the exclusion 
of a small number of observations signaled as outliers by a 
                     
21
 Using past values of differences in tariffs as an instrument makes little 
sense. Moreover, the average length of our sample (3.3 periods) makes it 
unsuitable for GMM estimations. 
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test on residuals. The pattern of signs is also broadly 
similar when we exclude one region at a time (see table A8). 
Finally, we replaced tariffs with alternative indices of trade 
liberalization (see results in table A9). The sign (and often 
the significance) of our interactions terms are robust to the 
use of various trade ratios (see columns 2, 3 and 4). However, 
when we use the openness measures of Hiscox and Kastner 
(2002), Spilimbergo et al. (1999), and Pritchett (1996), few 
coefficients of the interaction terms remain significant, 
although the signs remain the same (except in 4 cases). 
Overall, the results are moderately robust to alternative 
openness measures.  
 
4. Openness, Inequality and Poverty: Further Results  
 
 Arguably, in spite of controls for the type of survey, 
the data set used so far is of lesser quality than the more 
recent World Income Distribution (WYD)22 data set that is drawn 
almost entirely from household surveys thereby allowing us to 
define welfare aggregates and recipient units consistently 
across countries and time. The WYD data set which also 
provides information on income levels by deciles presents two 
advantages. First, it allows us to check for the robustness of 
our results in general, and also to the choice of inequality 
measure since we can work directly with decile data. Second, 
it is more appropriate to carry out estimates of the effects 
of trade liberalization on inequality and especially on 
poverty, both because the quality of the data is presumably 
higher, but also because the calculations can also be carried 
out directly from the household sample mean income per 
capita, itm , rather than from GDP per capita from national 
accounts. 
                     
22
 WYD can be downloaded from http://econ.worldbank.org/projects/inequality. 
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 Indeed, it has been argued that income measures from 
household survey data that is representative of the entire 
economy is a more reliable estimate of GDP than the 
corresponding measures from the national accounts. In 
particular, even though survey-based estimates of income have 
their own problems, Deaton (2005, p.18) argues that: “If we 
need to measure poverty in a way that will convince those who 
are skeptical of the idea that average growth reaches the 
poor, there is little choice but to use the surveys”.23  In our 
sample the correlation between annual income growth over 1988 
and 1998 measured from the surveys, Hg , and its equivalent from 
national income, PPPg , is surprisingly low, ( 0.2917ρ = ). 
Moreover regressing Hg  on PPPg  gives (std. errors in 
parenthesis): 2
(0.357)
0.029 0.706 ; 0.0851H PPPg g R= + = . 
 Following the approach and specification in (3), we 
regress the share of the j-th decile in country i, ijθ  (which 
is defined as the ratio between the absolute income of the j-
th decile,( ijty ), and the sample mean income, ( itm ) on , 5i tTAR − , 
the same set of relative endowments (REit), their interaction 
with 
, 5i tTAR − ,and a set of controls (Zit) including country and 
time dummies leading to the following equation to be estimated 
for each decile24:  
 
, 51 1 1
1,3
, 5 *2
1,3
                             ( ) 
ijt
it i tij i t j j m imt
mit
i t ijt
m imt j l ilt it
m l
y
D YR m TAR RE
m
TAR RE Z DS e
θ α β φ
φ δ
−
=
−
=
≡ = + + +  +
+ + + +
∑
∑ ∑
 (4) 
Table 6 reports the results for the bottom three and top three 
deciles (full results available in table A11).  
 
                     
23
 See Deaton (2005) for a deeper discussion on this issue. 
24
 As before, we take the logarithm for all continuous variables. 
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Insert table 6: Inequality (by decile), factor endowments and 
openness  
 
Besides plausible estimates with the FE estimator (Milanovic 
(2005, footnote 8 argues that because this panel is very short 
there is insufficient data variability to use such an 
estimator), the following patterns stand out. First, in spite 
of an insignificant correlation between GDP growth and sample 
mean income growth rates, the previous results hold over this 
sample period when using the Gini (or Theil) index as a 
measure of inequality. (Signs in column 7 of table 6 are the 
same as those in table 4 and, with the exception of 
K/L,significance holds for the interaction terms between 
tariffs and relative endowments.) 
 Turning to the decile estimates, by and large the same 
patterns continue to hold (remember the signs of the 
coefficients should be reversed in columns 1 to 3 (when 
compared with those in columns 7). We still find that a 
reduction in protection decreases the share of the lower 
deciles and that this effect is more pronounced for countries 
that have a high K/L ratio while the opposite holds for 
countries with a high arable land (AT/L) ratio. However, when 
it comes to breaking down skills, the results lose 
significance suggesting a lack of robustness when a finer 
breakdown of skills is attempted. While this should not be 
surprising since there is quite a high correlation across 
different endowment measures. Given the small time dimension, 
lack of controls and noise in the data, it is rather 
comforting that the signs are preserved and near significance 
for the measure of the non-educated. 
 These results were submitted to several robustness checks 
(see tables in the appendix; others available upon request). 
First, we ran the same regression without taking the logarithm 
of the variables, obtaining similar results. Regarding reverse 
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causality, as previously, we ran the same regression using 
future trade rather than past values and the results become 
mostly insignificant, suggesting that reverse causality should 
not be a problem here. As to control variables, in other 
specifications, we added government expenditure and/or an 
index of democracy, resulting in a large reduction in sample 
size. In general, the significant results in table 6 carry on 
to this smaller sample (see table A11).  
Since the correlation between tariff reductions and 
inequality after controlling for endowments is still 
significant in this shorter time span, we used the coefficient 
estimates in table 6 to simulate the average impact of a 5 
point decrease in tariffs (this corresponds to the average 
tariff reduction during that period) on the bottom and top 
three deciles for two aggregated developing ‘regions’: Latin 
America (15 countries) and East, South and South East Asia (11 
countries excluding Japan & Singapore).25 In each case, 
regional values are values averaged over countries in the 
region26 and only statistically significant coefficients are 
used which means that the simulations mostly capture the 
estimated effect of differences in K/L and AT/L ratios. 
Results of this simulation exercise are reported in table 7.  
 
Insert table 7: Decile changes in income simulated from a 5 
percentage points reduction in tariffs 
 
Subject to the validity of imposing the same reaction to 
tariff liberalization across countries, trade liberalization 
reduces the income of the first three deciles (and mildly up 
to decile 7) with usually a small increase for the top three 
                     
25
 In a previous draft we also included SSA as a region. However, SSA only 
has 10 observations spread over 5 countries, implying a very unbalanced 
panel with only two observations per country. 
26
 Because of the possibility of outliers and influential observations, we 
checked that the results in table 6 were not sensitive to the exclusion of 
outliers. 
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deciles. Regarding the interpretation of the growth that would 
be necessary to compensate for the adverse effect of trade 
liberalization on income inequality, Wacziarg and Welch (2003) 
report an increase in average yearly growth (over a 7-year 
period) of 0.5 percentage points following the trade 
liberalizations in their sample suggesting that the growth-
induced effects of trade liberalization would not be 
sufficient to compensate for the adverse distributional 
implications for the poorest quintile. 
Finally, the often-observed lack of sensitivity of 
aggregate measures of inequality to changes in the 
distribution of income is confirmed when inspecting the 
changes in the values of the Gini coefficients reported in 
table 7 (in spite of the large changes in mean decile incomes, 
Gini coefficient values only change at the third decimal). 
Because of the many biases likely to remain in these estimates 
in spite of the inclusion of many control variables, it is 
difficult to comment with confidence on the additional 
information provided by the detailed results on the decile 
data.   
As an alternative presentation of these orders of 
magnitude, figure 2 reports country-level estimates of the 
simulated changes in the bottom and top quintiles of the 
distribution.27 Gains and losses in the bottom quintile are 
mostly reflected in changes in the top quintile rather than 
the middle of the distribution. 
 
Insert figure 2: Simulated changes in quintile mean incomes of 
a 5 percentage points reduction in tariffs 
 
 
                     
27
 The simulations are based on average values over the period. Because of 
the inclusion of fixed effects in our estimations, actual values of mean 
quintile shares are extremely close to those reported in figure 2, 
obviating the need to comment on how the model fits the data.  
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5. Conclusions 
 
Much of previous research on the correlates of inequality 
has established that inequality is largely determined by 
factors that are quite different across countries and that 
change only slowly within countries. Notably, the effects of 
changes in trade policies, and of globalization more 
generally, have been difficult to detect. This paper has 
focused exclusively on within-country variations to trade 
policy changes while carefully disaggregating factor 
endowments. Overall, the results suggest that changes in 
inequality are correlated with changes in tariffs which are 
quite robust to inclusion of various controls and to changes 
in sample periods. 
Several patterns emerge from these conditional 
correlations that support the usefulness of resorting to 
factor-proportions theories of international trade when 
studying the effects of changes in trade policy on income 
distribution. 
First, along Stolper-Samuelson predictions, with income 
per capita serving as a proxy for factor endowments, trade 
liberalization is associated with an increase in inequality in 
high-income countries and a decrease in inequality in low-
income countries, a result that has escaped most previous 
studies that have neglected to distinguish within-country from 
between-country effects. 
Second, after accounting for several controls, when 
interacted with tariffs, factor endowments have the expected 
effects on inequality. Trade liberalization is associated with 
increases in inequality in capital-abundant and high-skill 
abundant countries. Increases in inequality are also 
positively correlated with trade liberalization in countries 
abundant in a non-educated labor force, though it decreases 
inequality in countries that are well-endowed with primary-
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educated labor. These results give support to the critics of 
globalization who often point out that trade liberalization in 
poor countries leads to increases in inequality. 
While spurious correlation cannot be excluded, this 
result on the pattern of signs is quite robust to the addition 
of several control variables which also carry expected signs. 
We find no evidence of reverse causality. Controlling for the 
sources of income distribution data is almost always 
significant along expected lines. A reduction in macroeconomic 
instability (proxied by a reduction in inflation) also reduces 
within-country inequality.  
More tentative conclusions are reached when it comes to 
the extending the analysis of distributional shifts by 
studying the whole income distribution rather than using 
aggregate distribution measures like the Gini or Theil 
coefficients. Over a shorter ten-year time-span, we obtain 
similar results with decile data, but the estimates often lack 
precision when we attempt to break down factor endowments 
beyond capital and labor to include skill and education 
levels. Nonetheless, even though measurement errors are 
probably exacerbated by the short temporal dimension, we would 
maintain that the relative robustness of the endowment effects 
to changes in specification justifies looking beyond averages 
and quantifying effects on the poor.      
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Tables to  
Trade Liberalization, Inequality, and Poverty: Endowments Matter 
by 
Julien Gourdon, Nicolas Maystre, Jaime de Melo 
 
 
Table 1: Countries in the samplea  
 
 Sample for the study on 1980-2000 Sample for the study on 1988-1998 
Regions Number of countries Number of obs. Number of countries Number of obs. 
Developed 20 66 19 51 
Africa & Middle East 14 42 10 23 
Asia 10 36 11 29 
Latin American 17 54 15 43 
Total 61 198 55 146 
Notes: List of countries is reported in Annex 1 and 2. 
a
 Transition and ex-USSR countries are excluded. Countries with less than two observations are also dropped 
from the sample 
 
 
Table 2: Data on Inequality and Openness 
 
Table 2: Inequality and Tariffs  
 
Region Year Gini Tariffs Region Year Gini Tariffs 
1980 33.4 2.9 1980 47.6 10.6 
1985 31.8 2.1 1985 48.1 13.6 
1990 33.1 1.7 1990 47.3 10.2 
 
Developed 
Countries 
1995 32.7 1 
 
Latin 
America 
1995 49.8 7.1 
1980 40.9 6.7 1980 42 19.8 
1985 40.7 8.1 1985 38.7 17.4 
1990 39.3 8.7 1990 38 19.1 
 
East Asia 
1995 39.2 6.4 
 
Middle 
East 
1995 37.7 12.2 
1980 35.7 19.1 1980 44.6 16.7 
1985 35.9 27.1 1985 46.7 18.2 
1990 36.2 25.3 1990 50.5 18.1 
 
South Asia 
1995 37.8 15.2 
 
Africa 
1995 46.3 17.9 
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Figure 1: Box Plots on Gini, Tariffs and GDP per capita ($PPP) : 1980 and 1995 
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Table 3: Inequality, income and openness 
 
 
 OLS OLS OLS+FE  FE (PCSE) 
 1 2 3 4 
 Gini Gini Gini Gini 
GDPpc -0.05 -0.06c 0.04 0.02 
 (1.10) (1.86) (0.46) – [0.60] (0.40) 
Tart-5 -4.23c -3.98b 2.96 3.27c 
 (1.91) (2.05) (1.25) - [1.47] (1.69) 
TARt-5*GDPpc 0.50c 0.49b -0.34 -0.37 
 (1.90) (2.15) (1.20) - [1.40] (1.61) 
Educ.Lab. 0.05 0.00 -0.05  
 (0.77) (0.06) (0.56) - [0.73]  
Mature -0.45a -0.44a -0.09  
 (5.25) (5.57) (0.55) - [0.71]  
Ethnicity 0.02 0.02b   
 (1.43) (2.07)   
Civ.Lib. 0.07 0.09b 0.02  
 (1.40) (2.32) (0.40) - [0.50]  
Inflation 0.06b 0.07a 0.02 0.02c 
 (1.91) (3.56) (1.46) - [1.95] (1.91) 
Gross/Net Income  -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 
  (0.37) (0.85) - [1.15] (1.23) 
Income/Expenditure  0.24a 0.15a 0.15a 
  (6.44) (3.20) - [4.91] (4.89) 
Households/Individual  -0.00 0.06b 0.06a 
  (0.02) (2.36) - [3.46] (3.43) 
Constant 5.22a 5.03a 3.40a 3.36a 
 (16.87) (18.30) (5.73) - [6.99] (8.15) 
     
Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes 
Year Effect No Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 217 217 217 217 
R-squared 0.44 0.60 0.91 0.90 
#of Countries 66 66 66 66 
      
Notes 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
c: Significant at 10%; b significant at 5%; a significant at 1% 
In column 3, Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses (based on robust Huber-White standard 
errors) and in brackets (based on Panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE)) 
PCSE: Panel-corrected standard errors (Beck and Katz (1995)) 
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Table 4 Inequality, factor endowments and openness 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Gini Gini Gini Gini Gini 
MinFuel  per Labor   (MF/L)     0.12b 
     (2.26) 
Arable Land per Labor   (AT/L) 0.26 0.17 0.18 -0.03 -0.08 
 (1.59) (1.01) (1.04) (0.20) (0.58) 
Capital per Labor    (K/L) -0.01 -0.03 -0.07 -0.00 0.00 
 (0.21) (0.77) (1.58) (0.04) (0.02) 
NoEd. per Labor    (NO/L) 0.12a     
 (3.20)     
BasEd. per Labor   (BS/L)  0.06    
  (1.03)    
SkillEd. per Labor    (SK/L)   0.12a   
   (3.88)   
SK/BS    0.07b 0.06c 
    (2.05) (1.67) 
NO/(SK+BS)    0.12a 0.14a 
    (3.32) (3.68) 
TARt-5 -0.30 -0.21 0.16 -0.55 -0.67 
 (0.64) (0.43) (0.38) (1.30) (1.62) 
(MF/L) * (TARt-5)     -0.05 
     (0.32) 
(AT/L) * (TARt-5) 0.05 0.11 -0.37 0.30 0.50 
 (0.10) (0.21) (0.85) (0.67) (1.05) 
(K/L) * (TARt-5) -0.50a -0.28 0.31 -0.52a -0.59a 
 (2.76) (1.57) (1.52) (2.63) (2.99) 
(NO/L) * (TARt-5) -1.39a     
 (2.76)     
(BS/L) * (TARt-5)  0.13    
  (0.31)    
(SK/L) * (TARt-5)   -0.73a   
   (3.21)   
(SK/BS) * (TARt-5)    -0.73a -0.66b 
    (2.78) (2.50) 
(NO/(SK+BS)) * (TARt-5)    -0.94a -1.07a 
    (3.19) (3.61) 
Inflation 0.03b 0.04a 0.03b 0.02 0.02 
 (2.53) (2.69) (2.56) (1.33) (1.37) 
Gross/Net Income -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.82) (0.81) (0.28) (0.94) (1.04) 
Income/Expenditure 0.15a 0.14a 0.14a 0.10a 0.11a 
 (5.43) (5.31) (5.04) (3.76) (3.87) 
Households/Individual 0.06a 0.06a 0.06a 0.07a 0.06a 
 (2.92) (3.28) (3.04) (3.50) (3.40) 
      
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 210 210 210 202 202 
#  Countries 64 64 64 61 61 
 
Notes: 
Panel-corrected standard errors (Beck and Katz (1995));  
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
c significant at 10%; b significant at 5%; a significant at 1% 
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Table 5: Tariff Reduction, inequality and factor endowments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
       
 
 
Variable Percentile 5 percentage points tariff reduction* 
(K/L) 0.25 0.4 
 0.75 6.0 
(SK/BS) 0.25 1.1 
 0.75 4.7 
(NO/(SK+BS)) 0.25 -0.4 
 0.75 5.4 
 
 * Percentage change in Gini coefficient 
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Table 6: Inequality, factor endowments and openness 
 
 lnθ1 lnθ2 lnθ3 lnθ8 lnθ9 lnθ10 lngini 
Tariffst-5 14.65a 6.08a 3.25a -0.32 -0.7990a -0.43 -1.14 
 (3.88) (4.12) (3.23) (0.93) (2.66) (0.49) (1.47) 
Mean income -0.20 -0.13 -0.08 -0.05a -0.0436b 0.13a 0.09b 
 (1.48) (1.62) (1.23) (2.76) (2.51) (2.99) (2.06) 
(K/L) 0.63b 0.19 0.11 0.06c 0.0341 -0.18a -0.12c 
 (2.27) (1.35) (0.97) (1.92) (0.89) (2.61) (1.65) 
(AT/L) 0.76 0.03 0.07 0.43a 0.2673b -0.69a -0.27 
 (0.83) (0.08) (0.27) (4.57) (2.08) (3.01) (1.30) 
(MF/L) -0.88b -0.30c -0.19c -0.06b -0.0314 0.19b 0.15b 
 (2.24) (1.90) (1.91) (2.00) (1.08) (2.50) (2.22) 
(SK/BS) 0.18 -0.02 -0.03 0.01 0.0489c -0.00 0.01 
 (1.00) (0.22) (0.49) (0.42) (1.86) (0.12) (0.29) 
(NO/(SK+BS)) -0.06 -0.11 -0.09 -0.00 0.0406 0.06 0.07 
 (0.29) (1.20) (1.09) (0.07) (1.44) (1.33) (1.09) 
(K/L) * (Tariffst-5) 3.80a 1.48a 0.86a -0.33a -0.4344a 0.10 -0.24 
 (3.31) (3.15) (2.70) (3.31) (4.07) (0.36) (0.94) 
(AT/L) * (Tariffst-5) -12.22a -4.69a -2.31a 0.05 0.3992 0.61 0.94 
 (3.03) (3.79) (2.74) (0.17) (1.35) (0.82) (1.26) 
(MF/L) * (Tariffst-5) -0.58 -0.21 -0.17 0.05 -0.0082 0.01 0.05 
 (1.07) (0.93) (1.04) (0.74) (0.13) (0.07) (0.40) 
(SK/(BS)) * (Tariffst-5) 0.68 0.09 0.08 -0.00 0.1017 -0.55 -0.67c 
 (0.56) (0.14) (0.18) (0.02) (0.61) (1.54) (1.91) 
(NO/(SK+BS)) * (Tariffst-5) 2.00 0.94 0.59 0.13 0.1362 -0.70c -0.55 
 (1.42) (1.60) (1.18) (1.05) (0.93) (1.92) (1.37) 
Inflation -0.19b -0.05 -0.02 0.00 0.0186 0.02 0.03c 
 (2.38) (1.52) (0.71) (0.47) (0.92) (0.94) (1.88) 
Income/expenditure -0.20a -0.09b -0.08a -0.00 0.0077 0.04 0.05b 
 (2.80) (2.56) (2.63) (0.20) (0.62) (1.60) (2.15) 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 146 146 146 146 146 146 146 
# Countries 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 
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Table 7: Decile changes in income simulated from a 5 percentage points reduction in 
tariffs 
 
• Sub-Saharan Africa  [0.464, 0.453]** 
 
Ghana (2)*, Lesotho (2), Kenya (2), Uganda (2), and Zimbabwe (2) 
 
  Decile  1 Decile  2 Decile 3 Decile 8 Decile 9 Decile  10 
A 1.9% - 2.3% 2.9% - 3.1% 3.9% - 4.0% 11.2% - 10.7% 15.6% - 15.4% 38.0% - 39.4% 
B 230 - 272 350 - 368 460 - 474 1291 - 1234 1774 - 1744 4191 - 4341 
A
fri
ca
 
C -1.70% -0.50% -0.30% 0.40% 0.20% -0.40% 
 
 
• Latin America  [0.482, 0.483]** 
 
Argentina (3), Bolivia (3), Brazil (3), Colombia (3), Costa Rica (3), Dominican Republic (3), 
Ecuador(3), Jamaica (3), Mexico (3), Nicaragua (2), Panama (3), Paraguay (2), Peru (3), Uruguay (3) 
and Venezuela (3) 
 
A 1.3% - 1.0% 2.5% - 2.3% 3.6% - 3.4% 11.6% - 11.5% 16.6% - 17.1% 38.0% - 38.1% 
B 348 - 280 704 - 636 1007 - 947 3306 - 3293 4763 - 4929 10994 - 11040 
La
tin
 
A
m
er
ic
a 
C 2.1% 1.0% 0.6% 0.0% -0.3% 0.0% 
 
 
• East, South and South-East Asia  [0.358, 0.357]** 
 
Bangladesh (2), China (2), India (3), Indonesia (2), Korea (3), Malaysia (3), Pakistan (3), Philippines 
(3), Singapore (3), Sri Lanka (3) and Thailand (3) 
 
A 3.0% - 2.2% 4.3% - 3.8% 5.2% - 4.9% 11.6% - 11.5% 15.1% - 15.3% 29.6% - 29.5% 
B 613 - 445 955 - 834 1184 - 1103 2704 - 2658 3486 - 3549 6692 - 6679 A
sia
 
C 3.1% 1.3% 0.7% 0.2% -0.2% 0.0% 
 
Row A corresponds to the relative shift of the share due to a 5 points decrease of tariffs.  
Row B corresponds to the shift of the absolute income of the share due to a 5 points decrease of tariffs. 
Row C shows the corresponding annual real growth (over the 10 years) that would be necessary to keep each 
decile’s income at its initial value. 
 
*Number of observations in parentheses. 
** Gini coefficients before and after simulated tariff reduction in brackets. 
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Figure 2: Simulated changes in quintile mean incomes of a 5 percentage points reduction in tariffs 
 
 
Figure 2a: bottom quintile* 
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Figure 2b: top quintile* 
 
 
 
* Simulated quintile share before tariff reduction on the horizontal axis, and changes in quintile share following 
the tariff reduction (here, a 5 percentage points) on the vertical axis. For example, the average income share of 
the poorest 20% of Indonesia (IDN) is reduced from 6% of total income to 4% after the tariff reduction 
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Annex 1: List of countries included in the sample 1980-2000(Gini from WIDER) 
 
  Countries 
Number of 
observations 
Argentina 3 
Barbados 1* 
Bolivia 2 
Brazil 3 
Chile 3 
Colombia 4 
Costa Rica 4 
Dom. Republic 4 
Ecuador 3 
Guatemala 1* 
Guyana 1* 
Honduras 1* 
Jamaica 3 
Mexico 4 
Nicaragua 2 
Panama 4 
Paraguay 2 
Peru 4 
Trinidad & Tobago 2 
Uruguay 3 
L
atin
 A
m
erica 
Venezuela 4 
Total 17 (21*) 54 (58*) 
Australia 4 
Austria 3 
Canada 4 
Cyprus 2 
Denmark 2 
Finland 3 
France 4 
Greece 4 
Ireland 3 
Italy 4 
Japan 4 
Netherlands 2 
New Zealand 2 
Norway 4 
Portugal 4 
Spain 4 
Sweden 4 
Switzerland 2 
United Kingdom 3 
D
ev
elo
p
ed
 C
o
u
n
tries 
United States 4 
Total 20 66 
  Countries 
Number of 
observations 
Botswana 1* 
Burundi 1* 
Cameroon 2 
Egypt 2 
Ghana 3 
Iran 4 
Israel 3 
Jordan 4 
Kenya 3 
Lesotho 2 
Malawi 4 
Mali 1* 
Mauritius 3 
Rwanda 1* 
Sierra Leone 1* 
South Africa 4 
Tanzania 1* 
Tunisia 4 
Uganda 2 
Zambia 1* 
A
frica an
d
 M
id
d
le E
ast 
Zimbabwe 2 
Total 14 (21*) 42 (49*) 
Bangladesh 3 
China 1* 
India 4 
Indonesia 3 
Korea Rep. 4 
Malaysia 3 
Nepal 1* 
Pakistan 4 
Philippines 3 
Singapore 4 
Sri Lanka 4 
A
sia 
Thailand 4 
Total 10 (12*) 36 (38*) 
 
 
 
* means that countries are excluded in our 
specifications with country fixed effects. 
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Annex 2: List of countries included in the sample 1988-1998 (deciles from WYD)
 
  Countries 
Number of 
observations 
Egypt 2 
Ghana 2 
Iran 3 
Jordan 3 
Kenya 2 
Lesotho 2 
South Africa 2 
Tunisia 3 
Uganda 2 
A
frica an
d
 M
id
d
le E
ast 
Zimbabwe 2 
Total 10 23 
Argentina 3 
Bolivia 3 
Brazil 3 
Colombia 3 
Costa Rica 3 
Dominican Rep 3 
Ecuador 3 
Jamaica 3 
Mexico 3 
Nicaragua 2 
Panama 3 
Paraguay 2 
Peru 3 
Uruguay 3 
L
atin
 A
m
erica 
Venezuela 3 
Total 15 43 
Bangladesh 2 
China 2 
India 3 
Indonesia 2 
Korea 3 
Malaysia 3 
Pakistan 3 
Philippines 3 
Singapore 2 
Sri Lanka 3 
A
sia 
Thailand 3 
Total 11 29 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
  Countries 
Number of 
observations 
Australia 2 
Austria 3 
Canada 3 
Cyprus 2 
Finland 2 
France 3 
Greece 3 
Ireland 3 
Israel 3 
Italy 3 
Japan 2 
Netherlands 3 
Norway 3 
Portugal 3 
Spain 2 
Sweden 3 
Switzerland 2 
United 
Kingdom 
3 
D
ev
elo
p
ed
 C
o
u
n
tries 
United States 3 
Total 19 51 
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Annex 3: List of variables 
 
Label Content Sources 
Gini Gini coefficients WIDER(2004) 
ShareX 
(X = 1,…, 10) 
Absolute income level of each decile normalized by the mean income. (X = 1 
corresponds to the poorest 10% of the population and X = 10 to the richest 
10%) 
WYD (2002)  
Mean It corresponds to the mean income derived from  household surveys (in 
current $PPP) 
WYD (2002) 
GDPpc GDP per capita, PPP (constant 1995 international $) Penn World Tables (2005) 
Capital  Capital per Worker Easterly and Levine (1999)  & 
Kraay and al. (2000) 
Land Land per labor force 
Land arable per labor force 
Crop Land per Labor force /Cereal Land per Labor force/Forest Land per 
Labor Force 
WDI (2004) 
Mining & Fuel  Production of minerals, coal and oil World Energy Council (2004) 
Education Average years of schooling  in the population over 15 years old Barro and Lee (2000) 
No Educated Proportion of the population over 15 years non educated  (or primary not 
completed) 
Barro and Lee (2000) 
Primary (Based) 
Educated 
Proportion of the population over 15 years primary educated (completed) (or 
secondary not completed) 
Barro and Lee (2000) 
High (Skilled) 
Educated 
Proportion of the population over 15 years High educated Barro and Lee (2000) 
Inflation Annual growth rate of the GDP implicit deflator. The GDP implicit deflator 
is the ratio of GDP in current local currency to GDP in constant local 
currency. 
WDI (2004) 
FDI Foreign Direct Investment as % of Gdp. UNCTAD Handbook of Int. Trade 
and Development Statistics (1996, 
1997, 2000) 
M2/Gdp Money and quasi money comprise  as % of Gdp. WDI (2004) 
Gov Expenditure Total expenditure includes both current and capital expenditures as % of 
Gdp 
WDI (2004) 
Mature Share of the population between 40 and 59 years old Higgins and Williamson (1999) 
Civil Liberties Measure the extent to which people are able to express their 
opinion openly without fears of reprisals and are protected in doing 
so by an independent judiciary. 
Freedom House 
Democracy Democracy is defined as “general openness of political institutions”.  The 
variable ranges from 0 (absence of democracy) to 10 (best) 
Monty G. Marshall and Keith 
Jaggers (2002). Polity IV Dataset.  
Ethnicity Herfindhal index which measure the probability for two individuals to be in 
a different group each other.  
La Porta and al. (1999) 
Infrastructure Quantity (Stock); Principal component analysis on road per km², telephone 
lines per workers, power Gigawatt per worker 
Quality: waiting times for phone com., energy losses, paved road 
Calderon and Serven (2004) 
Tariffs Import duties comprise all levies collected on goods at the point of entry into 
the country. In % of Imports 
WDI (2004) 
Index Dollar Index of price distortion Dollar (1992) 
Index Pritchett Adjusted Trade ratio: residual once we account for size and distance Pritchett (1996) 
Index Spilimbergo Adjusted Trade ratio: residual once we account for size, distance and 
difference in factor endowment 
Spilimbergo and al. (1999) 
Index Leamer Adjusted Net Trade ratio: residual once we account for size, distance and 
difference in factor endowment 
Leamer (1987) 
Index Hiscox & 
Kastner 
Fixed country years effect in a gravity model once we account for size, 
distance and difference in factor endowment. 
Hiscox & Kastner (2002) 
Black market 
premium 
Black market premium WDI (2004) 
Index Wacziarg & 
Welch 
Index taking value 0 or 1 depending on liberalization Wacziarg & Welch (2005) 
Tax Barro & Lee Tax on capital and input Barro and Lee (2002) 
(X+M)/Gdp Output trade ratio WDI (2004) 
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Annex 4: Construction of index of relative factor endowment 
 
 
 
Let iftE  is per capita endowment of country i in factor f in year t and 
*
ftE  the world per capita 
effective endowment of country i in factor f in year t , computed by weighting every country’s 
endowment by the population and by the degree of openness  
 
 
*
ift i
i i
ft
i
i i
X ME pop
GDP
E
X Mpop
GDP
 + 
× ×  
  
=
 + 
×  
  
∑
∑
 
 
 
The indicators of relative advantage is 
( )( )*ln ft
ift
ift E
EA =  
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Annex 5a: Relative Factor Endowments: percentile distribution 
 
 
Note: Values above (below) unity indicates a country endowment above (below) the sample 
average. 
 
 
Annex 5b:  Tariff Reduction, inequality and factor endowments (full result table 5) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
* Percentage change in Gini coefficient 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Obs. Percentile K/L AT/L MF/L SK/BS- NO/ (SK+BS) NO /L BS /L SK /L 
210 25 0,365 0,481 0,000 0,650 0,323 0,505 0,717 0,406 
 50 0,943 0,934 0,171 0,927 0,874 0,937 1,008 1,129 
 75 2,473 1,636 1,065 1,285 1,857 1,309 1,321 1,863 
Variable Percentile 5 percentage point tariff reduction* 
(K/L) 0.25 0.4 
 
0.75 6.0 
(AT/L) 0.25 5.2 
 
0.75 2.1 
(MF/L) 0.25 2..3 
 
0.75 3.4 
(SK/BS) 0.25 1.1 
 
0.75 4.7 
(NO/(SK+BS)) 0.25 -0.4 
 
0.75 5.4 
(NO/L) 0.25 
-3.2 
 
0.75 3.4 
(BS/L) 0.25 1.3 
 
0.75 0.9 
(SK/L) 0.25 
-4.1 
 0.75 1.5 
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Annex 6: Adding macro and institutional variables as control 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Gini Gini Gini Gini 
(AT/L) -0.0800 -0.1191 -0.0883 0.0844 
 (0.60) (0.92) (0.68) (0.67) 
(MF/L) 0.1066b 0.1148b 0.1290b 0.0292 
 (1.99) (2.19) (2.48) (0.65) 
(K/L) 0.0016 -0.0038 0.0312 -0.0964c 
 (0.04) (0.09) (0.52) (1.92) 
(SK/BS) 0.0629c 0.0684c 0.0573 0.0541c 
 (1.76) (1.88) (1.59) (1.71) 
NO/(SK+BS) 0.1347a 0.1443a 0.1487a 0.0657b 
 (3.62) (3.75) (3.93) (2.04) 
 
    
Tariff
 t-5 -0.6834c -0.6274 -0.2170 0.3274 
 (1.66) (1.48) (0.48) (0.79) 
 
    
(AT/L)*Tariff
 st-5 0.5006 0.5383 -0.0480 -0.7290c 
 (1.07) (1.12) (0.10) (1.73) 
(MF/L)*Tariffs
 t-5 -0.0482 -0.1293 -0.1534 -0.0022 
 (0.33) (0.90) (1.20) (0.02) 
(K/L)*Tariffs
 t-5 -0.5701a -0.6124a -0.3929c -0.0139 
 (2.87) (2.93) (1.79) (0.07) 
(SK/BS)*Tariffs
 t-5 -0.6815a -0.8937a -0.7086a -0.6884a 
 (2.59) (3.47) (2.59) (2.69) 
NO/(SK+BS)*Tariffs
 t-5 -1.0363a -1.1379a -1.3857a -0.7409a 
 (3.51) (3.91) (4.66) (2.96) 
 
    
Inflation 0.0166 0.0157 0.0158 0.0198 
 (1.29) (1.23) (1.20) (1.52) 
Civil Liberties 0.0234 0.0195 0.0229 0.0051 
 (0.56) (0.48) (0.53) (0.12) 
Gov. Expenditures (%Gdp) 
 -0.0579 -0.0589 -0.0378 
 
 (1.33) (1.45) (1.09) 
Infrastructure stock 
  -0.0133 0.0655 
 
  (0.23) (1.25) 
Infrastructure quality 
  -0.0247b -0.0242a 
 
  (2.52) (2.69) 
Financial depth (M2/Gdp) 
   -0.0162 
 
   (0.52) 
gross/net income -0.0172 -0.0076 -0.0039 -0.0365b 
 (0.99) (0.44) (0.22) (2.25) 
income/expenditure 0.1055a 0.0957a 0.1113a 0.1343a 
 (3.87) (4.02) (4.15) (5.40) 
Households/individual 0.0631a 0.0383b 0.0494a 0.0168 
 (3.41) (2.33) (2.90) (1.02) 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 202 194 178 141 
# Countries 61 61 56 46 
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 Annex 7: Inequality, different skill categories and openness in 
Quintile 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Quint1 Quint2 Quint3 Quint4 Quint5 Gini 
(AT/L) -1.2789b -0.7471a -0.1009 0.1524 0.2634c 0.0047 
 (2.35) (2.65) (0.53) (1.55) (1.65) (0.03) 
(MF/L) 0.1587 0.0641 0.0288 -0.0373 0.0052 0.0769 
 (1.34) (0.61) (0.45) (0.75) (0.11) (1.16) 
(K/L) -0.0313 0.0430 -0.0749 -0.0644 0.0471 0.0120 
 (0.19) (0.48) (1.17) (1.55) (1.07) (0.23) 
(SK/BS) -0.1403 -0.1224c -0.1558a 0.0300 0.0259 0.0747c 
 (1.33) (1.84) (2.85) (0.62) (0.86) (1.96) 
(NO/(SK+BS)) -0.2509b -0.1219c -0.0860c -0.0416 0.0767b 0.1746a 
 (2.15) (1.87) (1.92) (1.20) (2.32) (3.81) 
Tariffst-5 0.4429 -0.9382 -0.4793 -0.1430 0.4055 0.2700 
 (0.27) (1.05) (0.77) (0.37) (0.79) (0.47) 
(AT/L) * (Tariffst-5) 2.2169 1.6313 0.5474 -0.0282 -0.7021 -0.3462 
 (1.21) (1.48) (0.73) (0.06) (1.08) (0.61) 
(MF/L) * (Tariffst-5) -1.8282 -0.5524 -0.1929 -0.2062 0.4176 -0.4216 
 (1.53) (0.69) (0.27) (0.62) (0.98) (0.82) 
(K/L) * (Tariffst-5) 3.4739a 1.8325a 0.5288b 0.1616 -1.0226a -0.3766b 
 (6.51) (5.59) (2.19) (0.86) (6.73) (2.15) 
(SK/BS) * (Tariffst-5) 0.8075 0.3490 0.7972c 0.0536 0.0158 -0.8097a 
 (1.13) (0.75) (1.68) (0.15) (0.06) (2.91) 
(NO/(SK+BS)) * (Tariffst-5) 2.9618a 2.2255a 0.7086c 0.2726 -0.9611a -1.7310a 
 (2.97) (3.88) (1.71) (0.86) (3.39) (4.46) 
Inflation -0.0349 -0.0317 0.0531 0.0061 -0.0058 0.0457a 
 (0.97) (0.80) (1.14) (0.36) (0.26) (3.08) 
Gross/Net Income -0.0820 -0.0416 0.0553b 0.0695a -0.0298 0.0516b 
 (1.37) (1.34) (2.10) (3.93) (1.61) (2.43) 
Income/Expenditure 0.1118 -0.0626 -0.1498 -0.0259 -0.0009 0.1543a 
 (0.44) (0.53) (1.64) (0.60) (0.01) (5.53) 
Households/Individual -0.0747 0.0052 0.0329 -0.0358 0.0455 -0.0066 
 (0.33) (0.05) (0.52) (1.00) (0.89) (0.31) 
       
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Observations 135 135 135 135 135 135 
Number of P 45 45 45 45 45 45 
 
Notes: 
Column (6) corresponds to the specification of table 5 (column 7) but with the smaller sample of countries 
Figures in bold correspond to those obtained with the Gini measure.  
Figures in italics are opposite to those obtained with the Gini measure 
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Annex 8: Excluding one region at a time 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Without 
LAC 
Without 
EAP 
Without  
SA 
Without 
SSA 
Without 
MONA 
Without 
WE & NA 
(AT/L) -0.0327 -0.1662 -0.1098 0.0222 -0.1153 0.0651 
 (0.17) (1.18) (0.77) (0.16) (0.75) (0.46) 
(MF/L) 0.1365b 0.0931 0.1210b 0.1232b 0.1156b 0.1811a 
 (2.05) (1.43) (2.29) (2.39) (2.26) (2.86) 
(K/L) 0.0188 0.0998c -0.0145 -0.0213 0.0088 -0.0790c 
 (0.36) (1.67) (0.30) (0.45) (0.19) (1.72) 
(SK/BS) 0.0262 0.0911b 0.0574 0.0049 0.0595 0.1220b 
 (0.61) (2.36) (1.54) (0.13) (1.60) (2.25) 
(NO/(SK+BS)) 0.1091b 0.1497a 0.1391a 0.1235a 0.1564a 0.0770c 
 (2.39) (3.49) (3.40) (3.15) (3.81) (1.75) 
Tariffst-5 -0.8141 -1.0992a -0.7373 -0.1951 -0.2463 -0.0891 
 (1.51) (2.59) (1.60) (0.46) (0.51) (0.19) 
(AT/L) * (Tariffst-5) 1.1649c 1.0850b 0.5721 -0.2465 -0.1791 0.0233 
 (1.92) (2.21) (1.12) (0.53) (0.29) (0.05) 
(MF/L) * (Tariffst-5) -0.4412 -0.0629 -0.0497 0.0285 -0.0175 -0.0943 
 (1.04) (0.43) (0.32) (0.22) (0.12) (0.73) 
(K/L) * (Tariffst-5) -0.6864a -0.5343b -0.5842b -0.2835 -0.8142a -0.2140 
 (2.72) (2.51) (2.45) (1.17) (3.62) (0.96) 
(SK/BS) * (Tariffst-5) -0.5745b -0.7110b -0.7118b -0.1805 -0.6865b -1.0220a 
 (1.96) (2.51) (2.35) (0.57) (2.44) (3.09) 
(NO/(SK+BS)) * (Tariffst-5) -1.0310a -0.9240a -1.0162a -0.9432a -1.3939a -0.8426a 
 (2.93) (2.87) (2.74) (2.96) (4.25) (2.83) 
Inflation -0.0642 0.0086 0.0153 0.0282b 0.0184 0.0241b 
 (0.73) (0.63) (1.19) (2.16) (1.48) (2.11) 
Gross/Net Income -0.0022 -0.0164 -0.0224 0.0066 -0.0139 -0.0417b 
 (0.09) (0.88) (1.26) (0.36) (0.70) (2.34) 
Income/Expenditure 0.0967a 0.1066a 0.1094a 0.1168a 0.1092a 0.1148a 
 (2.86) (3.65) (3.67) (3.69) (3.96) (3.70) 
Households/Individual 0.0645b 0.0637a 0.0622a 0.0600a 0.0668a 0.0515b 
 (2.43) (3.43) (3.28) (3.07) (3.48) (2.10) 
       
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Observations 148 171 187 177 181 146 
Number of P 44 52 57 52 55 45 
 
Notes: 
Column (6) corresponds to the specification of table 5 (column 7) but with the smaller sample of countries 
Figures in bold correspond to those obtained with the Gini measure.  
Figures in italics are opposite to those obtained with the Gini measure 
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Annex 9: Using different measures of Trade Openness 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Tariffs (XM/Gdp) (M/Gdp) (X/Gdp) Hiscox & 
Kastner 
Spilimbergo 
et al. 
Prichett 
 Gini Gini Gini Gini Gini Gini Gini 
        
(AT/L) -0.2053 0.4239 0.4791 0.4936 -0.0250 -0.0362 -0.1355 
 (1.64) (1.37) (1.34) (1.43) (0.13) (0.17) (1.07) 
(MF/L) 0.1209b 0.2767 0.3434c 0.1824 0.0687 0.1700b 0.0668 
 (2.55) (1.21) (1.92) (1.30) (0.85) (2.39) (1.60) 
(K/L) -0.0224 -0.1650 -0.1031 -0.1200 -0.1508 -0.0493 0.0018 
 (0.47) (1.28) (1.02) (1.05) (1.45) (0.71) (0.04) 
(SK /BS) 0.0607c -0.3877a -0.3084b -0.3080a 0.0153 -0.0391 0.0065 
 (1.69) (2.58) (2.46) (2.65) (0.16) (0.41) (0.22) 
(NO/(SK+BS)) 0.1244a -0.2279 -0.0534 -0.2621b -0.2259a 0.1046 0.0262 
 (3.42) (1.60) (0.54) (2.14) (3.06) (1.49) (0.99) 
        
Opent-5 -0.4403 0.1229b 0.2824a 0.2074b 0.0266 0.0284b 0.1007b 
 (1.03) (2.08) (3.36) (2.33) (0.96) (2.27) (2.01) 
        
(AT/L)*Open
 t-5 0.3669 -0.0505 -0.1977b -0.1846c -0.0225 -0.0187 -0.0586 
 (0.70) (0.91) (1.98) (1.90) (1.32) (1.64) (1.38) 
(MF/L)*Open
 t-5 -0.2353 -0.0605b -0.0817 -0.0233 0.0138 -0.0147 -0.0576 
 (1.64) (2.10) (1.48) (0.61) (0.89) (1.01) (0.94) 
(K/L)*Open
 t-5 -0.4049c 0.0315 0.0182 0.0242 0.0216 0.0030 -0.0338 
 (1.71) (1.08) (0.69) (0.83) (1.03) (0.37) (1.00) 
(SK/BS)*Open
 t-5 -0.6691b 0.0973a 0.0948b 0.0918a -0.0019 0.0089 0.1598b 
 (2.32) (2.68) (2.57) (2.77) (0.09) (0.57) (2.47) 
(NO/(SK+BS)) Open
 t-5 -1.0085a 0.0670c 0.0251 0.0928a 0.0596a 0.0116 -0.0200 
 (3.31) (1.89) (0.81) (2.59) (3.77) (1.07) (0.37) 
        
Inflation 0.0052 0.0216 0.0117 0.0175 0.0124 0.0020 0.0039 
 (0.38) (1.37) (0.75) (1.09) (0.91) (0.14) (0.31) 
gross/net income -0.0321c -0.0314c -0.0425b -0.0466b -0.0317b -0.0440a -0.0407b 
 (1.92) (1.81) (2.32) (2.52) (2.14) (2.58) (2.45) 
income/expenditure 0.1002a 0.1080a 0.1057a 0.1087a 0.0989a 0.1065a 0.1107a 
 (3.55) (3.85) (3.88) (3.92) (3.69) (3.76) (4.11) 
household/individual 0.0650a 0.0714a 0.0642a 0.0716a 0.0691a 0.0689a 0.0651a 
 (3.52) (3.98) (3.66) (3.95) (3.90) (3.87) (3.63) 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 177 177 177 177 177 177 177 
# Countries 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 
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Annex  10: Inequality, factor endowments and openness (full results of table 6) 
 
 lnθ1 lnθ2 lnθ3 lnθ4 lnθ5 lnθ6 lnθ7 lnθ8 lnθ9 lnθ10 lngini lntheil 
Tariffst-5 14.6459a 6.0793a 3.2486a 2.0345b 1.6894b 1.0321c 0.3388 -0.3167 -0.7990a -0.4306 -1.1449 -2.2244 
 (3.88) (4.12) (3.23) (2.44) (2.49) (1.88) (0.76) (0.93) (2.66) (0.49) (1.47) (1.29) 
Mean income -0.2042 -0.1332 -0.0805 -0.0408 -0.0598 -0.0695b -0.0642a -0.0505a -0.0436b 0.1265a 0.0869b 0.2006b 
 (1.48) (1.62) (1.23) (0.70) (1.56) (2.55) (2.97) (2.76) (2.51) (2.99) (2.06) (2.20) 
(K/L) 0.6270b 0.1905 0.1056 0.0722 0.0838 0.0887b 0.0516 0.0603c 0.0341 -0.1808a -0.1229c -0.2983c 
 (2.27) (1.35) (0.97) (0.78) (1.40) (2.25) (1.53) (1.92) (0.89) (2.61) (1.65) (1.88) 
(AT/L) 0.7550 0.0328 0.0747 0.1589 0.2942c 0.4062a 0.4644a 0.4250a 0.2673b -0.6948a -0.2687 -0.7411c 
 (0.83) (0.08) (0.27) (0.66) (1.76) (3.22) (4.25) (4.57) (2.08) (3.01) (1.30) (1.65) 
(MF/L) -0.8847b -0.3018c -0.1896c -0.1515c -0.1612a -0.1302a -0.1290a -0.0627b -0.0314 0.1925b 0.1515b 0.3640b 
 (2.24) (1.90) (1.91) (1.95) (2.58) (2.73) (3.22) (2.00) (1.08) (2.50) (2.22) (2.41) 
(SK/BS) 0.1766 -0.0158 -0.0267 -0.0235 -0.0249 -0.0098 -0.0087 0.0065 0.0489c -0.0047 0.0130 0.0205 
 (1.00) (0.22) (0.49) (0.50) (0.73) (0.40) (0.43) (0.42) (1.86) (0.12) (0.29) (0.21) 
(NO/(SK+BS)) 
-0.0621 -0.1145 -0.0896 -0.0762 -0.0747c -0.0502b -0.0406c -0.0014 0.0406 0.0635 0.0666 0.1414 
 (0.29) (1.20) (1.09) (1.02) (1.67) (1.98) (1.81) (0.07) (1.44) (1.33) (1.09) (1.09) 
(K/L) * (Tariffst-5) 3.7957a 1.4825a 0.8644a 0.5135b 0.3970c 0.1301 -0.0277 -0.3332a -0.4344a 0.0992 -0.2417 -0.3059 
 (3.31) (3.15) (2.70) (2.01) (1.88) (0.79) (0.21) (3.31) (4.07) (0.36) (0.94) (0.54) 
(AT/L) * (Tariffst-5) -12.2183a -4.6897a -2.3084a -1.3152c -1.2517b -0.9016b -0.5356 0.0478 0.3992 0.6130 0.9350 1.9123 
 (3.03) (3.79) (2.74) (1.94) (2.26) (2.13) (1.49) (0.17) (1.35) (0.82) (1.26) (1.16) 
(MF/L) * (Tariffst-5) -0.5832 -0.2138 -0.1741 -0.1340 -0.0697 0.0152 0.0590 0.0473 -0.0082 0.0087 0.0517 0.1113 
 (1.07) (0.93) (1.04) (1.00) (0.67) (0.19) (0.79) (0.74) (0.13) (0.07) (0.40) (0.40) 
(SK/BS) * (Tariffst-5) 0.6794 0.0873 0.0788 -0.0876 -0.0307 -0.0194 0.0693 -0.0026 0.1017 -0.5459 -0.6657c -1.3784c 
 (0.56) (0.14) (0.18) (0.24) (0.11) (0.10) (0.41) (0.02) (0.61) (1.54) (1.91) (1.81) 
(NO/(SK+BS))*( Tariffst-5) 1.9963 0.9401 0.5866 0.3569 0.4028 0.2868 0.3500b 0.1342 0.1362 -0.6970c -0.5549 -1.2857 
 (1.42) (1.60) (1.18) (0.81) (1.34) (1.53) (2.09) (1.05) (0.93) (1.92) (1.37) (1.46) 
Inflation -0.1946b -0.0540 -0.0176 -0.0021 -0.0037 -0.0045 0.0026 0.0043 0.0186 0.0186 0.0314c 0.0658c 
 (2.38) (1.52) (0.71) (0.10) (0.23) (0.34) (0.23) (0.47) (0.92) (0.94) (1.88) (1.80) 
Income/expenditure -0.2013a -0.0943b -0.0782a -0.0553c -0.0343 -0.0205 -0.0117 -0.0023 0.0077 0.0416 0.0507b 0.1064b 
 (2.80) (2.56) (2.63) (1.96) (1.42) (0.99) (0.69) (0.20) (0.62) (1.60) (2.15) (2.05) 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 146 146 146 146 146 146 146 146 146 146 146 146 
# Countries 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 
 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
c significant at 10%; b significant at 5%; a significant at 1% 
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Annex  11: Inequality, factor endowments and openness (adding democracy and government expenditure) 
 
 
 lnθ1 lnθ2 lnθ3 lnθ4 lnθ5 lnθ6 lnθ7 lnθ8 lnθ9 lnθ10 lngini lntheil 
Tariffst-5 15.5875a 5.8575a 2.4075c 0.9256 0.6286 0.0638 -0.3640 -0.4348 -0.3479 0.5754 -0.1396 -0.1225 
 (4.01) (3.29) (1.75) (0.78) (0.76) (0.11) (0.76) (1.01) (0.81) (0.52) (0.15) (0.06) 
Mean income -0.0377 -0.0365 -0.0244 -0.0080 -0.0577 -0.0955a -0.0888a -0.0834a -0.0437 0.1297b 0.0651 0.1571 
 (0.20) (0.29) (0.23) (0.09) (1.08) (3.20) (3.70) (3.68) (1.63) (2.25) (1.04) (1.17) 
(K/L) 1.1080a 0.3143b 0.1127 0.0418 0.0395 0.0408 0.0187 0.0541c 0.0460 -0.1365c -0.0992 -0.2500 
 (3.75) (2.12) (0.97) (0.43) (0.63) (0.96) (0.56) (1.80) (1.11) (1.80) (1.23) (1.45) 
(AT/L) 2.6981b 0.4909 0.2191 0.1685 0.2764 0.3572b 0.3693b 0.3036b -0.0954 -0.4872 -0.3481 -0.7684 
 (2.29) (0.90) (0.54) (0.49) (1.13) (1.97) (2.52) (2.39) (0.62) (1.55) (1.24) (1.24) 
(MF/L) -0.7002b -0.2137 -0.1297 -0.1060 -0.1129c -0.0974b -0.0937b -0.0590c -0.0413 0.1344c 0.0811 0.2121 
 (2.30) (1.60) (1.35) (1.30) (1.86) (2.02) (2.38) (1.73) (1.08) (1.76) (1.27) (1.51) 
(SK/BS) 0.5310b 0.0841 0.0178 -0.0077 -0.0097 -0.0077 -0.0226 -0.0200 0.0198 0.0087 -0.0029 0.0005 
 (2.40) (0.96) (0.26) (0.13) (0.26) (0.32) (1.11) (1.13) (0.58) (0.19) (0.05) (0.00) 
(NO/(SK+BS)) 0.3755 0.0184 -0.0304 -0.0518 -0.0512 -0.0396 -0.0458b -0.0241 -0.0062 0.0658 0.0305 0.0817 
 (1.48) (0.17) (0.32) (0.63) (1.05) (1.50) (2.04) (1.12) (0.19) (1.23) (0.42) (0.53) 
(K/L) * (Tariffst-5) 2.7484b 1.1079b 0.5371 0.3119 0.1793 0.0008 -0.1267 -0.2348b -0.2840b 0.2439 0.0035 0.2128 
 (2.42) (2.17) (1.49) (1.07) (0.83) (0.00) (0.99) (2.05) (2.38) (0.83) (0.01) (0.36) 
(AT/L) * (Tariffst-5) -12.1632a -4.7621a -2.0592c -0.8906 -0.8345 -0.4805 -0.1936 0.1515 0.1669 0.1973 0.5870 1.1720 
 (3.14) (3.49) (1.95) (1.00) (1.27) (1.00) (0.49) (0.45) (0.43) (0.22) (0.68) (0.61) 
(MF/L) * (Tariffst-5) -0.6383 -0.0573 0.0113 0.0291 0.0636 0.0847 0.0987 -0.0124 -0.0842 -0.0850 -0.1134 -0.2222 
 (1.28) (0.33) (0.08) (0.22) (0.63) (1.04) (1.38) (0.24) (1.19) (0.72) (0.83) (0.74) 
(SK/BS) * (Tariffst-5) -2.4418 -0.3308 0.1797 0.4017 0.3879 0.3699 0.3412 0.2071 0.3233 -0.9294 -0.7880 -1.6544 
 (1.16) (0.32) (0.25) (0.75) (0.96) (1.21) (1.38) (0.97) (1.10) (1.63) (1.46) (1.40) 
(NO/(SK+BS))*( Tariffst-5) -2.0573 0.0104 0.3946 0.5806 0.6098 0.6037b 0.5918a 0.3928b 0.3674 -1.0347b -0.5974 -1.4476 
 (1.17) (0.01) (0.60) (1.02) (1.62) (2.44) (2.92) (2.29) (1.45) (2.17) (1.17) (1.30) 
Democracy 0.0113 0.0036 0.0016 -0.0013 -0.0022 -0.0018 -0.0020 -0.0024 -0.0060b 0.0013 -0.0037 -0.0068 
 (0.40) (0.29) (0.17) (0.16) (0.40) (0.47) (0.68) (0.96) (2.17) (0.21) (0.66) (0.55) 
Government expenditure -0.6073a -0.2088a -0.0951c -0.0265 -0.0181 -0.0070 0.0178 0.0218 0.0689c 0.0166 0.0711c 0.1220 
 (3.93) (2.97) (1.72) (0.51) (0.45) (0.20) (0.62) (0.90) (1.72) (0.33) (1.79) (1.38) 
Inflation -0.3638a -0.0986b -0.0221 0.0071 -0.0001 -0.0061 0.0037 -0.0010 0.0388 0.0148 0.0406c 0.0774 
 (3.60) (2.02) (0.58) (0.23) (0.01) (0.49) (0.39) (0.12) (1.38) (0.66) (1.81) (1.62) 
Income/expenditure 0.0573 -0.0249 -0.0651 -0.0642 -0.0429 -0.0299 -0.0207 -0.0027 -0.0210 0.0599c 0.0455 0.1047 
 (0.78) (0.47) (1.35) (1.45) (1.48) (1.42) (1.19) (0.18) (1.10) (1.85) (1.43) (1.52) 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 114 114 114 114 114 114 114 114 114 114 114 114 
# Countries 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 
 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses  
c significant at 10%; b significant at 5%; a significant at 1% 
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Annex 12: List of countries for the three regions and their average endowments 
used for calculation of the impact of a 5 points decrease in tariffs on inequality and 
poverty. 
 
 
 
• Latin America 
 
List of countries: 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Jamaica, 
Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela 
 
 
Variables # Obs. Mean Std. Dev 
K/L 43 -0.23 0.46 
AT/L 43 0.81 0.41 
MF/L 43 0.79 1.37 
SK/(BS) 43 0.02 0.34 
(SK+BS)/NO 43 -0.12 0.56 
 
 
• East, South and South-East Asia (except Japan and Singapore) 
 
List of countries: 
Bangladesh, China, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, Sri 
Lanka and Thailand 
 
Variables # Obs. Mean Std. Dev 
K/L 27 -1.01 0.87 
AT/L 27 0.44 0.21 
MF/L 27 0.27 0.35 
SK/(BS) 27 -0.09 0.58 
(SK+BS)/NO 27 0.06 0.98 
 
 
